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A B S T R A C T
Capitalist society, organization and values emerge from innovation and creativity. They form the ground for success
of every kind including the economic one, and can be achieved and realized legally or illegally. The regulation and con-
trol of these activities lies on the economic and political elites and highly positioned government officials as they, in the
eyes of the wider public, have the power and the authority to mitigate the unpredictable and hard-to-control effects of the
free market and other crisis situations. Such position allows the elites and officials to act legally or illegally, morally or
immorally and provides an opportunity for committing the white collar crime. White collar crime, perceived merely as
flaw in the complex system of risk management, is not being seen as a serious form of crime with perpetrators being stig-
matized by the society as a whole, although its features include misuse of trust, failed expectations, enormous loss of
money as well as altering and manipulating the behavior of population in the interest of elites. In spite of the fact that
lower classes’ crimes are visible, create fear and severe moral judgment from the majority of population, white collar
crimes affect critically the society as a whole and create a solid ground for economic disorders, namely the nation or
worldwide economic crisis. The paper examines the concept of economic crisis, legal responsibilities of corporations and
elites, market failures, dissolution of social values, and the role of government in turbulent times.
Keywords: white collar crime, expectations, trust, economic crises, government institutions
Introduction
Economic disorders can point to the failure of particu-
lar company, industry or the whole economic system as
well as the existence of the white collar crime. The paper
will discuss some aspects of global economic crisis in or-
der to create more vivid illustration of individual and cor-
porate behavior, especially in cases of moral hazard. Cap-
italist society, organization and values as it is already
known, are based on innovation and creativity. Those
two features of modern societies lay a base for a success
of any kind – including the financial (economic) one and
that success can be achieved legally or illegally. Regula-
tion, control and realization of those activities in the so-
ciety is the responsibility of economic and political elites
as well as highly ranked government and corporate offi-
cials. However, because of the innovative skills and
highly professional background of its perpetrators, white
collar crime is extremely difficult to prove and prosecute.
Unlike the organized crime, which has consequences
that are relatively visible and provoke immediate public
outrage, there is a crime committed by elites whose ef-
fects cannot be (easily) separated from free market ef-
fects and whose consequences remain invisible. When
this crime eventually reveals itself and »success« based
on it becomes widely known, the authorities react mainly
because of the public desire for retribution. In the eyes of
the regulators, white collar crime is more seen as a flaw
in complex system of risk management instead of being
seen as serious crime with morally corrupt persons as
perpetrators.
The need for more efficient prosecution of white col-
lar crime led to the concept of criminal responsibility of
the legal entities, creation of new secondary criminal
acts, sanctions for the entities putting the corporations
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in a situation where they must act as prosecutors’ assis-
tants with the obligation to prevent and reveal crimes
and their perpetrators.
Materials and Methods
This paper will analyze the white collar crime and
criminal responsibility of the legal entities as well as the
problem and importance of wider social context related
with this crime. The main hypothesis (H1) of the paper
is the following: Wider political, social and ethical con-
text prevents efficient prosecution of white collar crime
or allows its relative impunity. Auxiliary hypothesis
(H2) states that even with the evolution of criminal leg-
islation which enables relatively efficient prosecution of
these crimes, political character of many institutions
which do not act on the principles of reason and logic
but on negotiation proves not to be suitable for prose-
cuting white collar crimes which are deeply socially, po-
litically and economically interconnected and capable
of neutralizing the effect of criminal legislation as one of
the social subsystems. In that case, criminal legislation is
under an additional pressure to prove that crime is com-
mitted and to found the individuals and corporations re-
sponsible for it.
Discussion
From market failure and moral hazard to crime
When the crime committed reveals itself, especially
the large scale crime and the crime with lot of victims,
that has an impact on the role and competences of politi-
cians of various levels of government, their role and ca-
reers in the eyes of the public, and also initiates the po-
lice and judicial measures in the widest sense possible.
Defining one’s behavior as criminal depends on the wider
social context and historical circumstances. »In some his-
torical periods, certain acts of corruption were allowed or
mildly punished or even not considered corrupt at all.
Originally, the word »corruption« comes from Latin word
»corrumpo« which stands for viciousness, depravity,
bribery. In the second half of the 13th century, corruption
was related with judge’s misconduct – meaning his tak-
ing the money from clients in order to rule in their favor.
More precisely, in this context, the corruption was re-
lated with judge and the client alike. During the religious
war in the France (1574–1581), the corruption included
the acts of all the other public officials. As a turning
point in the prosecution of corruption in Europe, we can
mention the French Civil Code from 1810 adopted during
the Napoleon era, which implies the punishment for acts
of corruption committed by public officials, including the
ones in relation with performing duty. Afterwards, along
with the development of the modern public administra-
tion, various forms of abuse of official power have been
considered as acts of crime which violate the trust that
public has for independent work of public administra-
tion. At the beginning of the 20th century, accusations for
mass corruption within government representatives be-
came, for the first time, the most used instrument of po-
litical struggle and vocabulary in the United States of
America«¹. White collar and crime of elites, in the eyes of
the politicians, legislators and media is more seen as acts
based on poor judgments and poor system of risk man-
agement related with uncertain conditions. As a natural
consequence, in such situation we have a case of avoiding
the repression and legal prosecution². »Because of that,
the organized crime is present in the business, as they
have the same goal – in the form of profit. Particular dan-
ger and problem is criminal activity of multinational
companies, which owing to their economic power, are be-
coming a global political factor – and that can result not
only in economic but also in criminal acts that violate the
basic rights of population of certain region or state«³.
That leads to the special form of crime which is defined
as state crime – committed as a part of government, bu-
reaucracy, military policies actions etc.4. Unlike the afo-
rementioned form of crime which uses various forms of
organization and becomes either organized or corporate,
with the emergence of economic crises appears certain
kind of white collar crime defined as »control manage-
ment fraud«5. Insiders that control the operations inside
the company, and who manage to subordinate the work-
ers responsible for internal and external audit and re-
view, basically steal the resources from their own com-
pany and clients through various schemes, using the
government compensations to cover such behavior and
accounting as a tool to achieve their goals and avoid the
regulating agencies. New situation can be described as a
profit thirsty beast. Levi claims that is difficult to make a
distinction between white collar crime and usual busi-
ness transactions. In financing industry for example
there has to exist very close cooperation between loan of-
ficers, borrowers and lenders. Info about credit applica-
tion has to pass numerous levels of control and verifica-
tions by different actors in order for credit to be approved
in the first place. The problem was however in the wide-
spread culture inclined towards profit maximization and
financial goals along with absolute disregard for ethical
values and legal procedures6. Edwin Sutherland defined
the concept of white collar crime and further changes in
that concept were a result of social changes and academic
discussions, but always based on the fact that this form
of crime was committed by well known and respected in-
dividuals with high social status during their employ-
ment. Critiques of Sutherland’s concept can be summa-
rized as follows: conceptual, empirical, methodological,
legislative and political ambiguity2. Some of the research
conducted in this field do not coincide with the findings
of Sutherland’s work since according to other findings
(especially the one related with the research conducted
in seven federal districts in the USA between 1976 and
1978) majority of white collar crime was committed by
middle class members6. Definition of white collar crime
is related with multiple concepts starting from the un-
ethical behavior and characteristics of certain subcul-
ture, up to social harm and violation of the law in very
broad sense – from the criminal and administrative to
the civil. At the level of the organization, there are two
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possible sources of white collar crime. One is related with
individual behavior – rotten apple case and the other one
is related with whole criminal structure – or rotten bar-
rel case. The existence of either form of the white collar
crime can be an indicator of organizational or even the
failure of the whole industry. The term occupational
crime is connected with the individual’s occupation or
job while white collar crime has organizational-occupa-
tional dimension which in the end tends to show that the
individual is responsible7. Unlike the frauds committed
by organized criminals and the outsiders, there is part of
the elite whose actions cannot be differentiated from
normal functioning of the capitalism and whose mem-
bers keep their decency, do not provoke moral panic and
whose activities remain invisible. Once the crime is re-
vealed, often through media, and success based on such
crime becomes more open to public, the moral panic
starts. The authorities react mainly in order to protect
themselves and to satisfy the need of public for retribu-
tion and that sometimes ends in the adoption of laws af-
fecting the corporate elites2. However, this is a long-lasting
and visible process susceptible to elections and political
changes. Media and government manipulate with the
damaged populations’ expectations suggesting that the
losses are such that no one with the reason can longer ex-
pect the compensation while police officials and prosecu-
tors speak only in general terms how many should be ar-
rested – just to create an impression that judiciary is
doing something serious. This allows the member of the
elites to surpass the control. The very control of this type
of crime goes through auditing industry which requires
certain economic and political preconditions and gener-
ates both types of profit for small group of high class
members who control those processes using the public’s
fear as a guide to solve these problems. Too much of the
moral panic destroys credibility of the institutions and
individuals representing these institutions, and the on
the other side strengthens the influence of consultant
houses. According to their opinion, the response to white
collar crime is not in the repression and seizure of prop-
erty of the ones whose acts cannot be separated from core
businesses but in risk management2 and decision making
process and mechanisms that control that process.
Crime or deviation is more a proof of social class sub-
culture, marked as rotten barrel or systemic deviance –
rotten orchard. In that case we are talking about sys-
temic crime or system crime. »Systems« refers both to
the formal system – the police organization, the criminal
justice system and the broader socio-political context –
and to the informal system of deals, inducements, collu-
sion and understandings among deviant officers as to
how the corruption is to be organized, conducted and
rationalized7. Numerous theories try to make a distinc-
tion between the rotten apple and rotten barrel or or-
chard case. It is a complex task since the individual act of
crime cannot be easily separated from general micro and
macro context in which the crime was committed since
they are interrelated in many ways (it is well known that
the person will be less able and less likely to commit the
crime in the environment with high ethical norms). Re-
garding this issue it seems important to mention new
phenomenological forms of corruption directly or indi-
rectly related with white collar crime in specific context
that some authors discuss. Sajo makes a distinction be-
tween corruption and clientelism. According to him, cli-
entelism is a form of social organization (and as such al-
ways includes certain relations between 'patrons’ and
clients) while corruption is a special form of individual
social behavior which may or may not grow to be a mass
phenomenon. Sajo introduces a new term – »clientelistic
corruption« and defines it as a special form of structural
corruption which should be differentiated from discrete
individual types of corruption8. For the time being, cli-
entelistic structures’ primary interest is to reduce any
kind of insight into the existing relations of dependency
and creation of new social forces which would have real
and permanent interest in making the existing institu-
tions function properly and in the way that will recognize
with no delays any kind of corruptive or clientelistic be-
havior. Post-communist societies are characterized by in-
terdependent but different subsystems with limited mo-
bility, simplicity, low specialization, accentuated family
and other social ties based on solidarity. At the same
time, individuals and whole social groups, in a desire to
survive the burden of changes but also to stabilize their
position in social relations, increasingly rely on primary
social ties – meaning family and local community’s mem-
bers etc. Finally, at least when it comes to functioning of
the state and equality of the citizens in that state – as a
political community, the influence of the primary groups
is the highest when it comes to their demands to subordi-
nate the principles of formal distribution of jobs, rights
and goods to the primary social ties and more precisely to
emerging networks of different cliques. The influence of
family, friendship or some other kind of primary identifi-
cation impose themselves even in job selection for key po-
sitions, especially in public administration and judiciary,
making »inheriting position« and nepotism the most nat-
ural way of getting a job. In that way, the state becomes a
prisoner of various social cliques, dependent of primary
structure of human relations. Aware of this, Kregar im-
plicitly warns that the sources of corruption in public ad-
ministration and the inability of that administration to
function as a modern administration should, should be
looked for in the post-modern type of production and per-
sistence of new social groups in the uncertain conditions
of post-socialism modernization8. Reflections of the prob-
lem and crisis including the activities of network crime
(systems of white collar crime, corruption and cliente-
lism) are different in the mind of the individual and insti-
tutions. Some things are obvious even to the birds on the
trees, as one proverb says, but the authorities don’t do
anything about it as if they are blind. This saying has its
ground in scientific research. The impact of crisis on so-
cial institutions and political debate is by no means di-
vided from crisis’ impact on individual’s opinion. That is
related with three things9. First of all, there is an expec-
tation that the change in thinking leads to political de-
bate. Crisis experience has the potential to speed up
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restructuring of norms, rules, principles and decision
making process in solving particular problem, which in
the end leads to institutional changes, everything as a
consequence of overwhelming external shocks and crises
as a processes of adaptation. Crisis creates the opportuni-
ties for transformation and replacement of the existing
organizational structures. In reality, crisis can have ad-
verse effects if there are gaps or obstructions in the
mechanisms of coordination between social actors, espe-
cially when it comes to those parts of the structure that
are oversized and subject to massive planning and rou-
tine, indirectly even to corruption, and lack flexibility
when confronted with unexpected demands. Looking at
the big picture – the existence of numerous subsystems
like markets, politics, judiciary, media etc, it is possible to
see that their reactions to crisis and its consequences es-
pecially in the form of crime will not be unified or simul-
taneous. That raises questions about organizational rou-
tine and practice and demands redefinition of the roles
and harmonization of the activities of various social ac-
tors and segments, based on such crisis experience. Polit-
ical nature of many organizations creates problems since
political process in its essence requires negotiations,
agreements and it is the result of organizational or politi-
cal dynamics instead of application of pure logic or com-
mon sense to the past. Instead of crisis being an opportu-
nity for learning and adaptation as it is for the indivi-
dual, organization in the case of the crisis appears rigid
and inflexible, reduces the information processing or
channels used and perhaps what is most important con-
centrates the control or transfers control to the higher
level in hierarchy. That leads to the rigidity in response
to crisis9. Many analysts are absolutely pessimistic about
decision makers’ or government’s capacity to realize the
learning potential during the crisis. The reason for that
is the political character of the institutions. The very re-
action of the regulatory and other institutions to crises in
long term becomes predictable for individuals and profit-
-oriented subjects and creates conditions for acting on
the basis of moral hazard, which is similar to the white
collar crime. Moral hazard is the situation where a sub-
ject tends to undertake a certain act and related risk be-
cause the consequences of such act will be borne by
someone else (formally the state, but actually by the citi-
zens). »Organizational learning is not merely the individ-
ual learning, yet organizations learn only through the ex-
perience and actions of individuals and how it’s recently
suggested they learn mostly by the small group and work
team which replace the individual as a fundamental
learning unit in complex social and technical activities.
Analysts suggest that learning takes place even within
inter-organizational networks through communication
particularly in dynamic and competitive environment.
The learning concept from the institutional perspective
often focuses on the development of roles, rules, docu-
ments and routines. When individual and collective
knowledge is formed as a procedure, organization evol-
ves. In the essence that is political, social and technical
process which arises and dissolves with individuals« 9.
One of the key factors in positioning of the person in ille-
gal activities is studying the criminal activities in inter-
action with others in smaller groups or directly from up-
per class members7. As it is well known, the individual
will be less likely and less able to commit crime in the en-
vironment that has high ethical standards. One can con-
clude that although the individuals from the authorities
understand the nature of the emerging problem, the
mechanism of their actions in new situation is far more
complex than the one needed for corporate frauds and
rotten orchards of corrupted officials. According to Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigations (abbr. FBI), one has to pay
attention to white collar crime since this type of crime
creates higher social costs then everyday crime and lea-
ves severe physical and emotional consequences on the
victims which is characterized as demoralization cost
with consequential mistrust towards the ones that peo-
ple should trust. When perpetrators of white collar crime
appear in front of the court, it can be concluded that they
broke the law for the first time, have no prior convictions
and show no tendency towards the life of ordinary crimi-
nals. The research conducted in Norway tried to make a
distinction between the individual perpetrators of white
collar crime – rotten apples and group of such perpetra-
tors – rotten barrels. The authors of this research came
to the conclusion that – based on the sample they used –
a lot more perpetrators were a part of the wider crime
scheme – rotten barrels then it was the case with rotten
apples. When comparing the sentences given to perpetra-
tors of each category it turns out that these sentences
were milder for the members of the group then for the in-
dividual perpetrators since the first used loyalty to the
firm or limited liability given to positions they occupy in
hierarchy as an excuse in front of the court. On the other
side, there are huge differences between maximum sen-
tences between states. In the United States of America
spectacular cases like Bernard Madoff ended with the
150 year long jail sentence or Allen Stanford with 110
years of jail, while in Norway the maximum sentence for
this type of crime was 10 years of jail time and 2 years in
average. Individuals were sentenced on 2.8 years in aver-
age while the group members were given 1.9 years of jail
in average. Wealth of the individual perpetrators and the
wealth of group members were similar, with individuals
being slightly wealthier. Companies in focus were of simi-
lar size although in the cases of rotten apples the larger
sums of money were at stake than in the cases of rotten
barrels. Individuals dominated in corporate while groups
preferred occupational crime7. Since only 1/3 of the white
collar crime victims’ report that crime is committed, it is
very difficult to determine its scope and frequency. Legal
entities also do not report this type of crime since they
want to avoid bad publicity that could influence their cli-
ents. Given these facts, it is obvious that reliable or uni-
fied official statistics of this type of crime does not exist6.
The evolution of white collar crime theory starts with
Theory of Criminaloid of E.A. Ross from 1907 which ex-
plains the existence of perpetrator of one new unethical
and dishonorable act which is not yet formally forbidden
by the law. The concept of white collar crime defined by
Sutherland in 1949 was mentioned before while Clinard
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and Yeager developed corporate crime theory in which
employees commit crimes in the company’s interest and
related white collar crime’s subtype in the form of occu-
pational – vocational crime. Ermann and Ludman in
1978 explained organizational deviance which entails ac-
tions against norms set outside the organization but sup-
ported by everyday working norms inside the organiza-
tion. Deviance of the elites defined by Simon in 2006
includes activities of upper class members which may or
may not be considered as crime. Organized crime accord-
ing to Shrager and Short from 1978 involves acts of doing
or omission inside a formal organization for the realiza-
tion of operative goals of organization which have serious
physical and economic impacts on consumers, employees
and public. Green redefined the term occupational crime
in 1990 saying that is the act committed within the occu-
pation. This limited concept of white collar crime de-
scribes four variations of occupational crime: 1) crimes of
organizations related with occupation, which also entail
corporate crimes, 2) crimes committed within govern-
ment institutions, 3) crimes related with individual pro-
fession including the crimes of upper class members, 4)
crimes of individuals related with occupations of lower
social class. The importance of this classification lies in
the elaboration of all sorts of crime committed by em-
ployees while performing their duties 6. »Besides, only
few of the trials in front of the criminal courts ended in
convictions, partially because of the their lawyers’ tal-
ents and mild sentencing policy towards perpetrators
and partially because of the powerful lobbies from all lev-
els of government and relative immunity these individu-
als have because of their social prestige and power in-
cluding bribery«².
The responsibility of legal entities and prosecution
of corporate and white collar crime
The responsibility of legal entity is the recent insti-
tute in international conventions left to countries for im-
plementation in the form of criminal, administrative or
civil responsibility. In particular countries, the responsi-
bility of legal entities is incompatible with the constitu-
tional order or with the principle of guilt while in other
countries this principle was easy to implement. Some of
the international legal sources which relate to this mat-
ter were the following: Recommendation R(96) 8 from
September 9th of 1996 about criminal policy in Europe in
the times of changes, Convention about environmental
change and criminal law from 1998 which in the Article 9
obliges member states to adapt necessary corresponding
measures which will enable the imposition of the crimi-
nal or administrative sanctions or measures to legal enti-
ties on whose behalf some of the crimes were committed.
Criminal law convention about corruption from 1999 in
the Article 18 obliges states to adopt such legislation and
other measures necessary which will insure that legal en-
tities can be held responsible for crimes such as bribery,
trading in influence, money laundering assumed by the
Convention, done on their behalf by any physical person,
acting as individual or as part of the legal entity, which
has a leading role inside that entity based on the authori-
zation to represent, make decisions or control activities.
Cyber crime convention from 2001, Second protocol of
Convention on protection of European Union’s financial
interests, United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime from 2000, Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions from 1997 oblige member
states to introduce criminal or non-criminal responsibil-
ity of legal entities10. Every creative businessman or em-
ployee is capable of developing new kind of fraud which
technically cannot be described like one since it is not in
detail defined by the law and its existence actually falls
under category of legal loopholes. Otherwise, the applica-
tion of the existing rule on similar cases would create an
illicit legal analogy. This creates an eternal battle be-
tween legislators who try to close these loopholes by
adoption of new laws and constant creation of additional
law (lex specialis) and the ones acting dishonorably.
Great deal of dishonorable acts that fall under this cate-
gory are actually a part of everyday business practice and
usually outside the prosecutors’ reach. On the other
hand, procedural legislation requires that prosecutors
and agencies at his disposal with their own resources
provide evidence on which they base their cases with re-
spect to certain legal guarantees given to the suspect or
defendant. Under the guarantees of the criminal proce-
dural law one assumes the right against self-incrimina-
tion and lawyer-client privilege which should be unavail-
able to the prosecutor and provide efficient defense.
Corporations and employees create and use documents
as a part of the working process, which represent the
source of information, facts and evidences in criminal
procedure. Documents, dominantly in the form of busi-
ness reports, whose issuance is related with defendant’s
job or his corporation are either in employee’s personal
possession or product of corporative operations and
owned by corporation. This fact puts prosecutor in situa-
tion where his hands are tied and provides an explana-
tion for further law enhancement in this area directed to-
wards white collar and corporate crime suppression11.
The evolution of criminal law went beyond the tradi-
tional concept and in a direction of: creating secondary
acts of crime, proving mens rea or guilt as well as obtain-
ing evidence which goes beyond classical procedural gua-
rantees. The basic support for the development of these
features lies in the responsibility of legal entities, cre-
ation of new criminal offences and sanctions for the legal
entities11. The basis for liability of legal persons for crime
that perpetrator committed in the name of, for the ac-
count or benefit of that person exists10: a) when the pur-
pose of the criminal offence is arising from the conclu-
sion, order or permission of the managerial or supervi-
sory bodies of a legal person; or b) when the managerial
or supervisory bodies of a legal person have influenced
the perpetrator or enabled him to perpetrate the crimi-
nal offence; or c) when a legal person disposes of illegally
acquired material gain or uses objects obtained through
the criminal offence; or d) when the managerial or super-
visory bodies of a legal person have failed to carry out
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due supervision over the legality of work of the employ-
ees. It is necessary to differentiate between private legal
entity and public legal entity like government, county.
The legal entity gets its recognition by the system of reg-
istration, approval and law. When that occurs, this entity
gains its legal, business and tort ability. The responsibil-
ity of the legal person is not excluded and in fact exists
even when the perpetrator is not guilty for the crimes
committed and vice versa. The liability of the legal per-
son does not exclude the guilt of physical person or the
persons responsible for the crimes committed. For crimi-
nal offences perpetrated out of negligence, the legal per-
son can be liable under the conditions of law and in that
case may be punished less severely. That means that the
legal entity is responsible within the limits of its contri-
bution while the perpetrator is liable within the bound-
aries of its negligence. Criminal code of Bosnia and
Herzegovina adopted the model of derived and limited
accessory or indirect responsibility of legal entity for
crimes committed. Although the criminal responsibility
of the legal and physical person can be related, the ques-
tion is how these two can be separated11. Assuming that
one of the firm’s agents committed crime, one has to ask
whether holding the corporation legally responsible also
assumes the innocence of the managers or other share-
holders in certain crimes. Under the doctrine of manage-
rial or supervisory responsibility, the corporation will be
liable for the damage perpetrator made in the line of
duty. Vicarious responsibility is justified »not because the
principal really participated in wrongdoing or fraud, but
because the act was committed for the benefit of the
principal and it is legitimate to request his responsibility
for the damage individual suffered because of such be-
havior.« This doctrine was taken a step further in inter-
est of the public policy allowing for corporations to be
held criminally responsible even for the actions, knowl-
edge and final purpose of acts and omission of due super-
vision of their agents because without these elements
many acts of crime could go unpunished. Managerial
structures, managers as individuals as well as corpora-
tions are used as prosecutors’ and law enforcement agen-
cies’ assignees in order to suppress corporate and white
collar crime. The legal entity’s responsibility was ex-
panded to all the actions of the corporation not only the
actions of its employees. For example if employee »A« has
in his possession a certain information about the money
transfer of one of bank’s clients, employee »B« knows
something else about the same transfer and employee
»C« also, then the bank knows everything about that
transaction11. This laid foundations for legal entity’s re-
sponsibility based on the assumption of collective knowl-
edge. Decentralization and departmentalization of corpo-
rate activities divides operations and responsibilities into
smaller parts and components and unites them after-
wards into collective knowledge and makes corporations
responsible for failure to act in accordance with that
knowledge. According to that, corporations can be held
responsible even when employee committed no crime.
The only way the corporation can avoid this responsibil-
ity is to permanently monitor the activities of its employ-
ees which in the end enables prosecutors to cut costs of
crime prevention and transfer his efforts to corpora-
tion11. In the end, that means that corporations need to
have clear rules and instructions and to secure their im-
plementation because of the assumption of collective
knowledge. Prosecutors can therefore prove that unin-
tentional acts of individuals represent corporate crime
and use that, according to new legal solutions that go be-
yond the traditional legal guarantees and traditional
criminal law. There are various models of legal entity’s
criminal responsibility. These models are different whe-
ther they are based on responsibility of legal entities for
the acts committed by that entity or based on the respon-
sibility of that legal entity that is derived from the behav-
ior of the physical person as a perpetrator of the crime
and additionally whether the responsibility is objective
or subjective. »According to the model of derived or ac-
cessory responsibility, the responsibility of the legal per-
son is derived from the behavior or responsibility of the
physical person that acted in the name or for the benefit
of the legal person. Inside this model exist two separate
models – model of identification and vicarious model. Ac-
cording to the identification model, the legal entity is
identified with the responsible physical persons – the
ones in position- and the actions of these persons are con-
sidered as the actions of that legal entity. The guilt of the
legal entity is derived from the guilt of its responsible
persons. In a vicarious model, even the actions of the
non-managerial employees are considered as actions of
the corporation. The model of autonomous criminal re-
sponsibility of legal entity considers legal entity as entity
separated from its members and therefore responsible
for its actions. The legal entity’s actions that serve as a
basis for criminal responsibility are failures in organiza-
tion or omission of due control that should prevent
crimes from happening. If the legal entity’s responsibil-
ity for crimes is based on causing the prohibited conse-
quence, one can talk about objective responsibility. Ac-
cording to this model, responsibility is not based on guilt.
In the model of subjective responsibility, legal entity is
responsible if there is guilt present. In the model of de-
rived responsibility of legal entity, the guilt of the physi-
cal person as a perpetrator of the crime is detached to le-
gal person. In cases of autonomous model of legal entity’s
responsibility, the guilt of legal person is based on that
whether legal person implemented necessary measures
for preventing the illegal actions of its members«12. In
fact, in cases of corporations, the prosecutor does not
treat individuals as independent perpetrators of crime,
but puts them into the context of their working activities
– searching for documents corporations create as evi-
dence against them. These documents are not subject to
self-incrimination protection and that facilitates the pro-
cess for the prosecutor to the great extent. The docu-
ments not only include the actions of the corporation and
its employees but also all other information regarding
other corporations, which transforms corporations into
prosecutor’s assistants and evidence providers. Since
corporations do not have the privilege against self-in-
crimination as a part of determining guilt, prosecutors
A. Durakovi} and S. Durakovi}: Economic Turmoil and White Collar Crime, Coll. Antropol. 38 (2014) Suppl. 1: 101–111
106
have the free access to the documents that would other-
wise be unavailable to them. As it is already known, legal
entities’ goal is to earn profit, within the legal and other
boundaries but they are prone to commit crimes espe-
cially if given the right opportunity, in the country or
abroad and can be a tool for committing acts of crime in
the hands of the organized crime. On the other side, legal
entities are not only the perpetrators of the crimes but
also the victims of such crimes committed by other legal
entities or their own workers. Many crimes can be re-
lated with behavior of legal entities. Criminal offences
against economy, trade and security of payment systems,
tax related crimes, criminal offences against work rela-
tions, crimes against people’s health, environment, agri-
culture and other natural resources, crimes against public
safety of persons and property, crimes against judiciary
etc. Basically, all crimes defined in criminal code can be
in this category. Primary criminal acts are the ones men-
tioned above while money laundering and other forms of
obstruction of investigation and justice – defined in Cri-
minal Code of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina like
»tampering with evidence, giving false statements, fail-
ure to report a criminal offence or perpetrator« can be
classified as secondary acts of crime. The perpetrators of
these crimes are responsible and official physical per-
sons, as well as the legal entities whose guilt is derived
from the actions of the physical persons. Furthermore,
acts of crime can be perpetrated, attempted and directed
towards preparation of criminal offences and for each is
given an appropriate sentence. Giving false statement
and obstruction of justice can be used to prove the exis-
tence of primary crime. For obtaining the conviction for
obstruction of justice, the state has to prove that at least
one person in the company tried to persuade others to de-
stroy documents that may be related with investigation,
which is considerably easier to prove beyond reasonable
doubt then that the knowing person participated in the
fraudulent scheme to make commissions higher than
usual11. »The Recommendation of Ministerial Commit-
tee of Council of Europe R(88) 18 in the part related with
sanctions, after pointing out that the goal of the sanc-
tions against corporations should be: 1. prevention of fu-
ture crimes, 2. remuneration of victims, entails the intro-
duction of many sanctions – suitable for corporations –
ranging from warnings to dissolution of corporation. Ac-
cording to this document, sanctions and measures can be
applied solely or in combination with others, with or
without delays, as major or supplementary. The Recom-
mendation especially points out the growing number of
corporate crimes, which cause considerable damage to
individuals and community but also generate profit for
some as well as the difficulties caused by complexity of
corporate managerial structures which prevent identifi-
cation of individuals responsible for crimes commit-
ted«12. Sanctions for legal entities10 are fines, seizure of
property and dissolution of legal entity. The general rea-
sons for less severe punishment of legal person or release
from punishment is the behavior of its managerial and
supervisory bodies who willingly report the perpetrator
after the crime is committed (the case for less severe
punishment) or decide to return the illegally acquired
material gain or to remove the caused harmful effects or
to communicate the information concerning the grounds
for holding other legal persons liable (the reasons for re-
lease from punishment). In order to release the legal per-
son from paying the fine, the legal person has to prove:
that it has implemented the system or program of precise
behavior recording, that the criminal offence is recog-
nized as the act of its employees, that it has reported the
offence and that it has gathered all the evidence for gov-
ernment agencies – which could then serve as a basis for
indictment against corporation and its employees. The
question is whether all of this is a step in right direction
in case that corporation wants to clear itself from crimi-
nal charges. In order to reduce sentence or get the re-
lease from punishment based on cooperation, corpora-
tion first has to willingly and on time reveal and report
the illicit behavior, provide full cooperation to govern-
ment agencies during their investigation and clearly ac-
cept the responsibility for such behavior. Revealing the
criminal offence on time means that the offence has been
reported before the act was actually committed or that
the act was reported before the official investigation
started and in reasonable time after the corporation be-
came aware of such offence. Full cooperation requires
that the corporation accepts the investigation, provides
the government agencies with all information that are
known and needed for identifying the nature of criminal
offence and determining the individuals responsible for
criminal conduct. If organization fails to do so, the gov-
ernment agencies need to bear the burden of proof dur-
ing the trial – while the corporation is left to negate the
important factual elements of crime and guilt11. It is
needless to say that these provisions create a strong dis-
incentive for organization to organize defense from crim-
inal charges. Determining whether the organization co-
operated sufficiently in order for sentence to be reduced
is a task for the prosecutor. Since the court will not grant
the reduction of sentence without recommendation from
the prosecutor, corporation must be willing to give up its
attorney- client privilege, to refrain from paying its em-
ployees’ legal fees and to refuse to enter into joint de-
fense agreement with its employees. The prosecutor will
assess the willingness of corporation for cooperation
from its readiness for disclosure of information including
the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work
product protections with respect to internal investiga-
tion and communication between officers, directors, em-
ployees and counsel. The quality of cooperation is mea-
sured by timely and complete information and refraining
from demanding immunity agreements. Such measures
allow the prosecutor to obtain statements of possible wit-
nesses, subjects and targets without having to negotiate
with individuals and corporation11. This disables corpo-
ration to pay legal fees and defense for its employees and
agents, and prevents joint defense efforts for two and
more corporations in front of the court. Managerial bod-
ies of the company are obliged to collect all the facts and
pass them to the prosecutor – using in that way the re-
sults of the internal investigation against its own em-
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ployees. If the company fails to do so, it could face
charges for obstruction of justice. Organizations there-
fore don’t have the right to remain silent, they cannot
use the right against self-incrimination and presumption
of innocence in their case is virtually non-existent. The
only documentation protected from the official investiga-
tion is the one that corporation uses during the court
trial11. Since the corporation assists the prosecutor dur-
ing the investigation, at the same time it disables or ag-
gravates the defense of the individual and puts pressure
on them to plead guilty. In order to operate efficiently as
well as to prevent criminal offences from happening,
communication in corporation is necessary. That entails
certain level of secrecy (confidentiality) and trust which
has to exist on both sides. The employees will not be will-
ing to reveal the information if they could bear the conse-
quences especially in cases of criminal prosecution and
when internal information, previously considered as se-
cret, are publicly disclosed by the prosecutor. On the
other hand, law requires that company has efficient sur-
veillance system over its business activities – and be-
cause of that companies try to secure the alternative
ways of information gathering where they can to certain
level but not absolutely grant secrecy. The example is the
possibility of anonymous reporting or open telephone
line for complaints. Each and every document that is cre-
ated on a daily basis creates new evidence that could be
used against corporation. Formal lines of communication
in corporation very often do not serve as corridor for the
most important information since there is an intentional
diverting or non-sharing of information from the com-
pany’s parts and employees because they want to manip-
ulate or reward certain behavior, escape the self-incrimi-
nation or they have fear of leaving any written trace of
communication. The fact that corporation has the overall
knowledge on which the responsibility of that corpora-
tion is based (because of the omission of due diligence)
will put it in situation where it will must choose between
conducting the internal evaluation and making an accu-
sation against itself and refraining from the investiga-
tion and official claiming that it has no knowledge about
what is taking place in corporation. The company agrees
to conduct the investigation only if the criminal offence
becomes known to the authorities and only then agrees
to cooperate – because in that case has nothing to lose11.
The white collar crime and economic crises
White collar crime and its manifestations are espe-
cially visible during great economic disorders in the form
of national and international economic crises. Although
it is difficult to determine with certainty whether the cri-
sis are results of corporate and elite crime or the unethi-
cal and in the end criminal behavior is a consequence of
poor economic conditions, it is absolutely clear that cri-
ses and white collar crime are connected with bonds that
cannot be broken – as confirmed by theory and practice.
Before the World War I, crises were caused (among other
things) by lies and frauds and after the Great Depression
(1929–1933) crises based on speculations were one of the
prominent types of economic crises. Criminal of high offi-
cials and corporations can always be, to certain extent,
interpreted or justified by the market failure, failure of
state regulation and prevalence of profit as the measure
of success and that at the same time creates a basis for
covering up, diminishing and subsequent revival of this
negative phenomenon. The experiences from the two dif-
ferent economic crises speak in favor of these findings –
the Savings and Loan Crisis (S&L) from the 1980’es and
the latest Global Economic Crisis 2008–2010 – both origi-
nally from the United States of America. S&L Crisis
from the 1980’es started with the state deregulation
measures in financial sector – mainly with Depository In-
stitutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act from
1980 and Garn-St. Germain Act from 19825. These chan-
ges included: a phasing out of limits on deposit interest
rates, elimination of the 5 percent limit on brokered de-
posits, permitting thrifts to make commercial real estate
and other loans and direct investments in their own
properties as well as to issue credit cards, allowing a sin-
gle entrepreneur to operate a federally insured thrift in-
stead of requirement according to which thrifts need to
have at least 400 stockholders with no individual owing
more than 25 percent of stock, the thrift could be foun-
ded by non-cash assets like land or real estate. All these
changes were introduced with rising at the same time
federal deposit insurance per savings account. These
measures draw get-rich-quick entrepreneurs to this pre-
viously successful industry. They would then run down
the thrifts’ resources and then pass them – bankrupt as
they were – to the government for rescue. The role of
government agencies was then to reimburse the deposi-
tors with taxpayer’s money but drying up of those re-
sources led eventually to their bankruptcy as well. The
fact that draws special attention is that deregulation it-
self was more a result of the lobbying efforts of powerful
people with interest in S&L industry than anything else.
The list of transactions related with fraudulent behavior
begins with land flips (piece of property is sold back and
forth between two or more partners inflating in that way
the sales price and refinancing the property with loan
until the value increases several times over), continues
with reciprocal lending (situation where the thrift offi-
cers and directors made loans to the officers and direc-
tors from other thrift), linked financing (where the loan
would be approved under the condition that the deposi-
tion of money into the financial institution is made),
nominee loans (financing of borrowers indirectly con-
nected with the thrift) and continues with illegal trading
(where usually honest bankers and thrift’s directors
fight for deposits which they later use for speculative in-
vestments hoping that this practice would save the thrift
from bankruptcy), looting (where thrift corporations
were used as a means for achieving personal gain) and
covering up (whose goal was covering up or hiding the
thrift’s insolvency and the fraud that contributed to that
insolvency with the use of accounting as a tool – usually
preferred by white collar criminals). Besides insiders and
management personnel, many outsiders like professional
accounting companies, real estate appraisers, lawyers,
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and politicians participated in these criminal schemes
and formed entire criminal networks. Although at first,
the assessed losses in S&L industry due to frauds and
crime in general were only 3 percent of the total losses,
later they were assessed as taking as much as 70 to 80
percent of the total losses amounting to 100 billion dol-
lars. 91 percent of those charged for white collar crime
were formally convicted and mainly received prison sen-
tences, but large proportion of perpetrators remained
undetected5. The late Global Economic Crisis (2008–
2010) originated in the USA was caused by, among other
things by, loose monetary policy and politics of low inter-
est rates, problems in mortgage market, deregulation of
the certain institutions in financial sector, speculative ac-
tivities of great number of financial institutions (private
and state sponsored) as well as a illicit practice of regula-
tory agencies. Deregulation was related with legal and
business changes in American banking system, changes
in potential and activities of two state sponsored enter-
prises devoted to mortgage lending »Fannie Mae« and
»Freddy Mac«. Introduction of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
in 1999 permitted the mergers of commercial and invest-
ment banks which previously was not the case. Further-
more, the deregulation in this field brought about fur-
ther changes like widening the distance between lender
and borrower, easing the conditions necessary for obtain-
ing loans, introduction of new financial derivatives by
the banks and other financial institutions like Collateral-
ized Debt Obligations (abbr. CDO’s) and Mortgage Based
Securities (abbr. MBS’s) which allowed mortgages and
other types of debt to be packaged and re-sold again and
again. Changes also included new accounting standards
like mark-to-market rule according to which the price of
the mortgage loan is recorded by the market instead of
historical price and off balance sheet investing (mainly in
Structured Investment Vehicles – abbr. SIV’s). All of this
reduced the need of lender (bank) to practice much
needed oversight because if a loan went bad it would no
longer belong to them13, and they would have the money
for new mortgage loan. The requirements that a bank
needs to fulfill were diminishing while the mortgage
sales’ provision was getting bigger and bigger. Along with
the other favorable conditions (low interest rates, rise in
rate of borrowing and expected housing price run-up),
this increased the number of those who bought the pack-
ages of mortgage loans. The first in that chain were in-
vestment banks, which bought the mortgages from the
commercial banks, and securitized them and with provi-
sion sold them to the another financial institutions like
state sponsored enterprises, hedge funds, pension funds,
and finally to the domestic and foreign investors. In that
process, hundreds and even thousands of mortgage debts
would be transformed into one package of bonds, which
would then be divided into numerous parts and sold at
the financial market. The buyers of these bonds could
not (even if they wanted) assess the riskiness of such in-
vestments – mainly because certain MBS’s contained
various mortgage loans and investors relied mostly on
credit rating agencies (like Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s,
Fitch’s) for risk evaluation of such investments. These
agencies however, as a profit making businesses, tried to
keep or attract new clients (mainly investment banks)
with grading their mortgage securities (regardless of
their quality) as highly profitable14. The special role in
the formation of housing bubble, besides other state com-
panies, had two government charted agencies – the Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association (abbr. Fannie Mae)
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (abbr.
Freddie Mac). Primary function of these two enterprises
(especially the Fannie Mae) was to stimulate commercial
banks in providing the loans for building houses for
whose repayment they guaranteed while their role ex-
panded to securitization and buy-out of mortgage
loans15. In 1999, under the pressure from Clinton’s ad-
ministration, these two companies began with the pilot
program of guaranteeing the payment of mortgage loans
for persons lacking the proper credit histories – mainly
the poor population and later with subprime mortgage
market activities which led them (and the state) 10 years
after into the situation where they must repay in full the
main part of these mortgages in the market and cause
the breakdown of American financial system. Also, seri-
ous mistakes and failures of private companies and insti-
tutions in every phase of the originate-and-sell model of
mortgage loans – its issuance, securitization, rating and
risk management – contributed to the great extent to the
complexity and depth of the crisis and the emergence of
white collar crime. Mortgage originators (issuers and
sales agents) were oriented mainly towards the sales’
commissions which depended mainly on the number of
mortgages issued. Securitizers (financial institutions)
made investors’ risk assessment impossible by the pro-
cess of securitization of mortgage loans. Credit rating
agencies rated highly the MBS’s and CDO’s, but soon af-
ter the crisis began they downgraded them abruptly –
which further undermined the investor confidence in
these securities. Investors, mainly individuals didn’t
bother much to check on the riskiness of securities but
relied solely on the opinion of the rating agencies. Finan-
cial institutions failed to manage risk and protect them-
selves from the investing in MBS’s and CDO’s keeping
them often off-balance sheet (in the form of SIV’s). When
a demand for these financial products decreased, some of
these financial institutions were forced to put SIV’s back
onto their balance sheets which created funding pres-
sures, decreased the capital ratios and tighten the credit.
Changes in financial industry un/intentionally worsened
the situation on the real estate market, especially the one
related with implementation of the later much criticized
mark-to-market rule15 which obliged financial institu-
tions to value their MBS’s and CDO’s at current market
prices which was positive as long the prices on the mort-
gage market were running up but after the prices went
the other way – the value of companies’ assets went down
as well. The abolishment of the so called »uptick rule« ac-
cording to which the investor who expects the decline in
stock price can sell those stock only after the price starts
to rise back again, because of the decision of the Ameri-
can Security and Exchange Commission, led to disap-
pearing of the protection against sharp fall of stock
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prices, and indirectly to the extreme instability in finan-
cial markets. Constant use and introduction of new fi-
nancial derivatives (like for example specific instruments
like Credit Default Swaps – abbr. CDS’s – based on the
transfer of the default risk) 15 additionally decreased the
visibility of risk and made the situation on the market
even worse. In order to achieve more easily some of their
goals, the corporations directly bribed the state officials.
Countrywide Financial (the biggest issuer of common
and subprime mortgages in the United States before the
housing market crash and the biggest client of Fannie
Mae) tried to influence the state officials with offering af-
fordable (VIP) loans for houses and apartments. Amongst
them were the members of the US Congress, the mem-
bers of Department of Housing and Urban Development
and the executives of the Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac.
Also, some of the former chief executive officers from the
Countrywide occupied prominent positions in Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, all which finally led to the law-
suits related with mortgages and other offences. Along
with profit motivated frauds and frauds motivated with
acquiring ownership, the emergence of moral hazard re-
lated with antirecession programs of US government
proved to be extremely serious problem. Programs like
700 billions of dollars’ worth Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (abbr.TARP)16 were directed towards the rescue of
the corporations responsible for the crisis and explained
solely by the slogans like »to big, to global, to involved to
fail«17 instead of applying proper sanctions and slogans
like »to guilty to remain free«. Legal sanctions for the
ones contributing greatly to the crisis or causing the
most damage did not take place and the same applies to
the reaction of judiciary and investigative agencies. The-
se authorities were, accidentally or not, more directed to-
wards the individuals applying for the loans. In 2007 the
FBI announced partnership with the Mortgage Bankers
Association – abbr. MBA and trivialized to the great ex-
tent the mortgage frauds committed by the mortgage
providers and went the opposite way to accuse the bor-
rowers for such frauds. The FBI together with the MBA
even went that far to create posters warning customers
that if they cheated the mortgage lenders, the FBI would
investigate them as borrowers5. The experiences from
the periods of crisis provide further proof for considering
the white collar crime as a crime whose emergence is
closely related with state deregulation, whose upraise
follows the market’s expansion and whose termination
and new cycle begins with the state antirecession – res-
cue programs.
Conclusion
Economic activities can be a good cover for unethical,
harmful and criminal acts of individuals and groups in
the line of their duties and professions defined previously
as occupational or corporate crime perpetrated in the
name, for the account or benefit of corporations. The
evolution of criminal law towards the definition of new
criminal offences in the field of economy and regulatory
norms from certain industrial branches along with the
possible use of secondary criminal offences (committed
by the persons not related with the principal criminal of-
fence but who failed to report it, cover up such acts or im-
pede the investigation) in the indictment and liability of
legal entities for crimes committed, should help the pre-
vention and prosecution of white collar crimes. The spec-
ificity of collecting evidence, and non-existent presump-
tion of innocence of legal persons should persuade the
legal person to provide help and cooperate with the pros-
ecutor if it wants to avoid penalties. The responsibility of
the legal entity is based on the assumption of collective
knowledge which can be very adequately used in the con-
text of proving the criminal viability of corporation. It
can therefore be concluded that the legal entity has no or
very little chance to escape from punishment if the effi-
cient judiciary exists. However, the judiciary system is
just one of the social subsystems which has influence on
the white collar crime. The other important subsystems
are media, politics and legislative processes aimed at
adoption of new laws. In fact, the white collar crime re-
veals itself first through the scandals in media. Informa-
tion and facts that appear during such scandals point to-
wards the biggest and the most obvious crises but they
cannot be considered as totally reliable. Once this crime
is revealed and »success« based on it becomes widely
known, the authorities react mainly because of the public
desire for retribution. Even here, the political nature of
many organizations creates problems since political pro-
cesses require negotiations, agreements and they are a
result of organizational or political dynamics instead of
application of pure logic or common sense to the past. In
that way, basic logic is twisted because instead of crisis
being seen an opportunity for learning and adaptation,
as it is often in the case of individuals, the social subsys-
tems responsible for the control appear rigid and inflexi-
ble in their response to crisis. Because of high influence
the corporations and stakeholders have and the pressure
they put on the media, the crisis is presented as a conse-
quence of market fluctuations and risk management fail-
ures instead of being portrayed as a consequence of im-
moral conduct of individuals or corporations. Only few of
the trials in front of the criminal courts ended in convic-
tions, partially because of the perpetrators’ lawyers’ tal-
ents, mild sentencing policy towards perpetrators, diffi-
culties in proving the white collar crime and partially
because of the powerful lobbies from all levels of govern-
ment and relative immunity these individuals have be-
cause of their social prestige and power. Even if the con-
viction for crime finally occurs, some studies have shown
that the individual perpetrators or rotten apples receive
more severe sentences than the members of the group or
rotten orchard because the later use loyalty to the firm or
limited liability as an excuse in front of the court. In the
former socialist states, although the anticorruption laws
have been adopted, the nature of systemic corruption
(previously defined as »clientelistic corruption« which
serves as a means for maintaining certain groups in the
political positions and controlling the new generations of
managers, companies and state officials and implemen-
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ted through the creation of close relations and nepotism,
typical for earlier epochs – not the modern state), dis-
ables their implementation and conceals the existing
ownership and business processes and relations.
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EKONOMSKA PREVIRANJA I KRIMINAL BIJELOG OVRATNIKA-TR@I[NI KRAH,
DR@AVNI NEUSPJEH ILI PAD DRU[TVENIH VRIJEDNOSTI
S A @ E T A K
Kapitalisti~ko dru{tvo, organizacija i vrijednosti proizlaze iz inovacija i kreativnosti. Oni ~ine temelj za uspjeh svake
vrste, uklju~uju}i gospodarske, a mo`e se posti}i legalno ili ilegalno. Regulacija i kontrola tih aktivnosti le`i na gospo-
darskim i politi~kim elitama i visoko pozicioniranim dr`avnim du`nosnicima koji u o~ima {ire javnosti, imaju mo} i
autoritet kako bi se umanjili nepredvidivi i te{ko kontrolirani u~inci i druge krizne situacije. Takav polo`aj omogu}uje
eliti i du`nosnicima da djeluju legalno ili nelegalno, moralno ili nemoralno te se pru`a mogu}nost za po~injenje kri-
minala bijelog ovratnika. Ovakav kriminal do`ivljava se samo kao mana u slo`enom sustavu upravljanja rizicima, a ne
gleda se kao ozbiljan oblik kriminala s po~initeljima stigmatizirah od strane dru{tva u cjelini, iako njegove karakte-
ristike uklju~uju zlouporabu povjerenja te ogroman gubitak novca. Unato~ ~injenici da su vidljivi, zlo~ini ni`e klase
stvaraju strah i te{ku moralnu osudu od ve}ine populacije, dok zlo~ini bijelih ovratnika utje~u na dru{tvo u cjelini, te
stvaraju ~vrste temelje za ekonomski poreme}aj i Svjetsku gospodarsku krizu. U radu se razmatra koncept ekonomske
krize, pravne odgovornosti korporacija i elita, tr`i{nih neuspjeha, raspada dru{tvenih vrijednosti te uloge vlada u tur-
bulentnim vremenima.
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